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NOTES
DISCOVERY: HICKMAN V. TAYLOR,
A DECADE LATER
It has now been well over a decade since the historical decision
of Hickman v. Taylor' was handed down by the Supreme Court.
This controversial case stirred up an entire new realm of thinking,
debate, and confusion within the field of discovery. Undoubtedly,
no other case within the field is so often cited. It will be the scope
of this study to analyze, as well as possible, some of the more per-
tinent repercussions of the Hickman decision.
I. PRIVILEGE
One of the prime purposes of the court in the Hickman case was
to limit the meaning of privilege within the field of discovery. In
so doing, they restricted the idea of privilege, not to work done by
the attorney for his client, but solely to the actual communications
of the client to the attorney.2 This aspect of the Hickman decision
has been largely followed by the subsequent decisions. Courts agree
that the privilege applies to communications between client and
attorney, 3 but not to communications between attorney and third
parties, 4 such as statements of witnesses. 5 The privilege has been
said to apply to communications between client's agents and attor-
ney." Instead of the attorney-client privilege, the Hickman decision
established the work product protection, which was an entirely dif-
ferent concept than privilege.' While most courts have decided
that privilege is to be decided as in the laws of evidence, 8 the work
product protection is a vague generality which seems to depend
largely upon the interpretations of the individual courts. But be-
fore passing on to this hard to define concept called "work product",
a few more comments on the remnants of the privilege theory might
be appropriate.
Not all courts have completely abandoned the principle,9 nor has
1. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
2. Hickman v, Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
3. See Brookshire v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 14 F.R.D. 154 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
4. Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 425 (N.D. Ohio
1947).
5. Mills Music v. Cromwell Music, 14 F.R.D. 411 (S.D. N.Y. 1953); Stoie v. Grayson
Shops Inc., 8 F.R.D. 101 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
6. "Danisch v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 18 F.R.D. 77 (S.D. N.Y. 1955).
7. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery
Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953); See also Carpenter-Trant Drilling Co. v. Magnolia
Petroleum Corp., 23 F.R.D. 257 (D. Neb. 1959).
8. Carpenter-Trant Drilling Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 23 F.R.D. 257 (D.
Neb. 1959); Wild v. Payson, 7 F.R.D. 495 (S.D. N.Y. 1946).
9. See Brush'v. Harkins, 9 F.R.D. 681 (S.D. Mo. 1950).
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their terminology in referring to the "work product" theory been
technically accurate. Many courts continue to insist upon calling it
"work product" privilege,"' "work product" immunity," or else com-
bine the two and imply equal protection.12 But other courts have
used the more accurate term of protection,'- which seems to give the
right connotation that the material will be given special consider-
ation but will not be absolutely immune. Procedurally, the courts
have stated that if the attorney-client privilege is pleaded and not
proven, the "work product" protection will not be presumed by the
court.'4 Nor does a waiver of the attorney-client privilege waive
the work product protection, for again the reasons for the two rules
are different."
II. WORK PRODUCT
Just what is this work product to which the Hickman decision
allows a limited protection? Basically, it is the work an attorney
does for his client, but a more specific definition appears to have
eluded the courts. An analysis will be made of some of the more
paramount issues involved in this concept.
A. Preparation for Trial. Most courts refuse to call it work pro-
duct unless it is in preparation for trial or in anticipation of litiga-
tion.'6 However, just what this means seems to be the difficulty.
It has been said that ordinary course of business,' 7 and work done
by agents and investigators in routine work,"8 even if gathered by
an attorney,'9 are not to be considered in preparation. Even though
the work done may ultimately be used at trial, it is still not consid-
ered work product."' Also, it must presently be part of the work
files of the attorney whether gathered in preparation or not.21 It is
stated, though, that routine work done by claim agents and the like
10. See Slifka Fabrics v. Providence Washington Insurance Co., 19 F.R.D. 374 (S.D.
N.Y. 1956); Smith v. Washington Gas Light Co., 7 F.R.D. 735 (D.D.C. 1948); Cold Metal
Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 425 (N.D. Ohio 1947).
11. See Vilastor-Kent Theatre Corp.-v. Brandt, 19 F.R.D. 522 (S.D. N.Y. 1956).
12. See Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953);
Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 13 F.R.D. 438 (S.D. N.Y. 1952).
13. See Tobacco and Allied Stocks v. Transamerica Corp., 16 F.R.D. 534 (D. Del.
1954); Scourtes v. Fred Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio, 1953).
14. Humphries v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 14 F.R.D. 177 (N.D Ohio 1953).
15. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 16 F.R.D. 5 (S.D. N.Y. 1954).
16. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F.Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954).
Ci. Henderson v. Southern Railway Co., 17 F.R.D. 349 (E.D. Tenn. 1955); Rediker v.
Warfield, 11 F.R.D. 125 (S.D. N.Y. 1951); Brauner v United States, 10 F.R.D. 468
(E.D. Penn. 1950).
17. Morrone v. Southern Pac. Co., 7 F.R.D. 214 (S.D. Calif. 1947).
18. Hughes v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 7 F.R.D. 737 (E.D. N.Y. 1948).
19. Park & Tilford Distillers- Corp. v. United States, 20 F.R.D. 404 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
20. Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
21. United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. Mich. 1954)
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should be considered in preparation and anticipation of trial, be-
cause this is the only purpose of such work.
22
B. Work Done by Agents of the Attorney. One of the most de-
bated features of the work product theory is whether work done
by laymen agents of the attorney should be called work product.
Undoubtedly the leading case on this question is Alltmont v. United
States2 3 which draws no distinction between statements taken by
counsel himself and those taken by others for his use in preparation
for trial. But there are a considerable number of courts which do not
recognize it as work product. -2 4 This is only one of the highly un-
settled ramifications of the Hickman decision.
C. Work of Experts. Another question is whether the work of
experts hired by the attorney should be considered part of his work
product. Such work has been considered to be work product,25
which can be reached only under the most unusual circumstances;
-
however, it still should be in preparation for trial.27 Before the
Hickman decision a 1940 case set a different tenor.28  They held that
to allow another attorney to obtain such material would be the same
as taking his property without compensation. This public policy
approach has had some following since the Hickman decision."'
Other courts do not discuss either work product or public policy
but simply hold the material undiscoverable, 30 or only discoverable
under absolute necessity."' At least one court 2 attempted to form
a synthesis by saying that if the expert was the person responsible
for deciding all matters from which the cause of action arose, it
could be discovered.
D. Legal Skill. The courts quite often also require that the work
involve the legal skill and training of the attorney. 3 This appears
22. Safeway Stores v. Reynolds, 176 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
23. 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949). Accord, Thompson v. Hoitsma, 19 F.R.D. 112
(D. N.J. 1956); Snyder v. United States, 20 F.R.D. 7 (E.D. N.Y. 1956).
24. United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. Calif. 1954);
Szymanski v. New York, N. H. and H. R. Co., 14 FE.R.D. 82 (S.D. N.Y. 1952); Panella
v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 14 F.R.D. 196 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
25. Carpenter-Trant Drilling Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 23 F.R.D. 257 (D. Neb.
1959); Schuyler v. United Airlines, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 111 (N.D. Penn. 1950).
26. Colden v. R. J. Schofield Motors, 14 F.R.D. 521 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
27. Schuyler v. United Airlines, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 111 (N.D. Penn. 1950).
28. Lewis v. United Airlines Transport Corp., 32 F.Supp. 21 (W.D. Penn. 1940).
29. Roberson v. Graham Corp., 14 F.R.D. 83 (D. Mass. 1952); Gold Medal Process
Co. v. Aluminum Co., 7 F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass. 1947).
30. Hickey v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 88 (E.D. Penn. 1952).
31. United States v. 48 Jars More or Less, 23 F.R.D. 192 (D.D.C. 1958).
32. Moran v. Pittsburgh-DesMoines Steel Co., 6 F.R.D. 594 (W.D. Penn. 1947).
33. Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Company, 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio, 1953);
Molly v. Trawler Flying Cloud, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 158 (D. Mass. 1950); Brush v. Harkins,
9 F.R.D. 681 (S.D. Mo. 1950); United States v. Deere & Co., 9 F.R.D. 523 (D. Minn.
1949).
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contradictory to the fact that the work of experts and agents can
be considered work product.3
4
III. SOME APPLICATIONS OF THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE
It might be well to stop for a moment and see just how this work
product doctrine applies to some particular aspects of the attorney's
preparation for trial.
A. Statements. Most of the cases dealing with the work product
doctrine either directly or indirectly involve statements taken from
prospective witnesses. The biggest controversy surrounding state-
ments is whether they actually involve the legal skill of the attorney.
Courts have stated, by way of dictum, that when the statement is
simple recordation,35 or verbatim transcribing of the witness's
words- the statement cannot be considered as work product. But
it has been said that the framing of questions by an attorney in-
volves his legal skill, as only he knows what might be important.3
Purely factual accounts-have been called non-work product. 38 Again,
the courts emphasize the requirement- that the statements be taken
in preparation for trial to be called work product and deny the pro-
tection to statements taken in the routine course of business,3 9 even
though the person taking the statement is an attorney.40 Copies of
statements which reflect the opinion or mental impression of an at-
torney are protected.
41
B. Photographs, Maps, Diagrams. Photographs taken by or at
the direction of, an attorney have normally been discoverable," at
least if the scene of the photo has changed 4 3 or the other party had
a better opportunity to take the pictures. 4   But it has been said
that if there was once opportunity to take the photo, the party
cannot now claim discovery of it,45 it has also been suggested that
photographs can reflect the legal skill of the attorney and can be
treated as work product.46  In at least one instance diagrams have
34. See Leding v. United States Rubber Company, 2 'F.R.D. 220 (D. Mont. 1959).
35. See Molloy v. Trawler Flying Cloud, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 158 (D. Mass. 1950).
36. See Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D, 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
37. United States v. Deere & Co., 9 F.R.D. 523 (D. Minn. 1949).
38. Lundberg v. Welles, 11 F.R.D. 136 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
39. Brown v. New York, New Haven and Hartford1 Railroad Co., 17 F.R.D. 324 (S.D.
N.Y. 1955); Pannella v..Baltimore and 0. R. Co., 14 F.R.D. 196 (N.D. Ohio "1951);
Tower v. Southern Pacific Co., 11 F.R.D. 174 (N.D. Calif. 1951).
40. Newell v. Capital Transit Co., 7 F.R.D. 732 (D.D.C. 1948).
41. Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 193).
42. Helverson v. J. J. Newberry Co., 16 F.R.D. 330 (W.D. Mo. 1954). See Brush v.
Harkins, 9 F.R.D. 681 (S.D. Mo. 1950) (dictum).
43. Helverson v. J.JJ. Newberry Co., 16 F.R.D. 330 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
44. Cogdill v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 7 F.R.D. 411 E.D..Tenn. 1947).
45. United States v. Great Northern Railway Co., 18 F.R.D. 357 (N.D. Calif. 1955).
46. See Shields v. Sobelman, 64 F.Supp. 619 (E.D. Penn. 1946) (dictum).
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been said to reflect the attorney's impression of the scene and there-
fore were protected.
4 7
C. Legal Opinions or Conclusions. Authority, upon this point is
scanty, but a comparison of two points of view might reflect the pos-
sible outcome of any attempt to obtain such information. A request
for the basis of an allegation of contributory negligence can be dis-
covered,4 s but a question asking whether the allegation will be res
ipsa loquitur will not.49 The court in the latter situation felt that a
layman could not think of this assertion; therefore, it reflected legal
skill.
50
IV. RULE 33 OR 34?
Another issue raised by the Hickman case is whether or not the
statements or other information sought can be obtained by request-
ing that said information be attached to the answers to interroga-
tories. 51 In brief, may the petitioner circumvent Rule 34,52 and ob-
tain a statement under Rule 33,51 by asking that said statement be
attached to answers to interrogatories asking if they are in exist-
ence? The problem involved is that the former requires a showing
of good cause, while the latter does not.
Some of the courts adhere to a strict procedural technique denying
the production under Rule '3 and requiring a new motion under
Rule 34.5' Others state that if good cause has been shown, the re-
quest will be allowed under Rule 335, giving quite often as a reason
that this will facilitate a quicker trial.16 Occasionally, a court will
allow the motion under Rule 33 without a mention of good cause.5 7
North Dakota rules allow the discovery under Rule 33 without ex-
plicitly mentioning that good cause is necessary.58
V. THE DIscovERY OF A PARTY'S OWN STATEMENT
Although not a part of the Hickman decision, the question of
47. Brush v. Harkins, 9 F.R.D. 681 (S.D. Mo. 1950).
48. Forsythe v. Baltimore and 0. R. Co., 15 F.R.D. 191 (W.D. Penn. 1954).
49. Cleimshaw v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 21 F.R.D. 300 (D. Del. 1957).
50. For an excellent discussion see B. & S. Drilling Co. v. Hallibuton Oil Well Cementing
Co., 24 F.R.D. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
51. Hickman v. Tayor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
52. Fed. B. Civ. P. 34.
53. Fed. B. Civ. P. 33.
54. Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3rd Cir. 1949); Harris v. Marine Trans-
port Lines, 22 F.R.D. 484 (E.D. N.Y. 1958); Kluchenac v. Oswald and Hess Co., 20
F.R.D. 87 (W.D. Penn. 1957); Lester v. Isbrandtsen Co., 10 F.R.D. 338 (S.D. Tex.
1950).
55. New York Central Railroad Co. v. Carr, 251 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1957); Novick v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 18 F.R.D. 296 (W.D. Pensn. 1955); Hesch v. Erie R. Co., 14
F.R.D. 518 (N.D.-Ohio 1952).
56. Kennedy v, -Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 7 F.R.D. 78 (E.D. Tenn. 1946);
Novick v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 18 F.R.D. 296 (W.D. Penn. 1955).
57. Hayman v. Pullman Co., 8 F.R.D. 238 (N.D. Ohio 1948).
58. NI.D..R. Civ. P. 33.
1961]
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whether or not a party can discover his own statement which he has
given to adverse counsel is frequently connected with this general
problem. The courts have tended to treat this issue on its own
merits and have often raised the issue of work product.
It has been said that the discovery of such a statement is not an
automatic right, but it is dependent upon the showing of good
cause." Good cause has been shown in some cases where the party
was not represented by counsel at the time he gave the statement, 0
but this is not always considered good cause.- Many courts have
denied production when the petitioner failed to show that fraud,
deceit, or duress were employed in the obtaining of the statement.1
2
A showing of good cause has quite uniformly been refuted when a
party only wants to check what he said,6 3 but dimming of memory
has been held sufficient reason."' One court has said, that if any-
thing, such a statement should be more difficult to obtain than those
of third party witnesses.6 5
VI. DoCrRINE APPLIED TO INTERROGATORIES
Although this analysis is more directly concerned with attempts
to obtain documents considered the work product of the attorney,
it might be well to stop and briefly discuss the work product con-
cept as it has been applied to interrogatories.
The work product doctrine does not apply to a question of the
existence of such work product, but only to its contents.66 Also it is
not necessary to show good cause in an attempt to secure such in-
formation as to its existence. 67 However, as shall be seen, not all
courts apply this rule in a liberal sense. The greatest controversy in
this field is the attempt by counsel to obtain the names of witnesses.
It has been quite uniformly held that the names of witnesses to be
used at trial are not discoverable, 8 but some courts have permitted
59. Shupe v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 19 F.R.D. 144 (W.D. Penn. 1956).
60. Novick v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 18 F.R.D. 296 (W.D. Penn. 1955); Goldner
v. Chicago and N.W. Ry. System, 13 F.R.D. 326 (N.D. Ill. 1952); Miehle v. United
States, 11 F.R.D. 582 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
61. Safeway Stores v. Reynolds, 176 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
62. Bixler v. Proctor Academy, 15 F.R.D. 503 (D. N.H. 1954); Lester v. Isbrandtsen
Co., 10 F.R.D. 338 (S.D. Tex. 1950); Raudenbush v. Reading, 9 F.R.D. 670 (E.D. Penn.
1950).
63. Safeway Stores v. Reynolds, 176 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Lester v. Isbrandtsen
Co., 10 F.R.D. 338 (S.D. Tex. 1950); Raudenbush v. Reading, 9 F.R.D. 670 (E.D. Penn.
1950).
64. New York Central Railroad Company v. Carr, 251 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1957).
65. Safeway Stores v. Reynolds, 176 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
66. McCall v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 16 F.R.D. 467 (S.D. N.Y. 1954).
67. Chatman v. American Export Lines, 20 F.R.D. 176 (S.D. N.Y. 1956).
68. Central Hide & Rendering Co. v. B-M-K Corporation, 19 F.R.D. 294 (D. Del.
1956); Aktiebolaget Vargos v. Clark, 8 F.R.D. 635 (D.D.C. 1949). See B & S Drilling
Co. v. Hallibuton Oil Well Cementing Co., 24 F.R.D., 1 (S.D. Tex. 1959) (dictum).
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counsel to obtain the names of people who gave statements0 or
those known to have knowledge of the facts.7" However, it has
been said that such information is privileged if learned in the course
of preparation for trial.7
One court first denied the information because it asked for the
names of witnesses obtained by the defendant, 72 stating this was an
invasion of counsel's files. The court stated that the identity and lo-
cation of such persons having knowledge of relevant facts should
have been asked. But later, when the question was thus framed,
the information was denied because it called for a mere conclusion.-
As to the contents of a document, it has been held that if the
document itself cannot be obtained, information contained in it
need not be revealed,7 4 but a 1959 decision7" was so liberal in allow-
ing the attorney to obtain the information contained in the docu-
ments and also the conclusions of the adverse attorney, that it seem-
ed to allow substantially the same information to be obtained by
interrogatory that the work product doctrine attempts to protect.
VII. GOOD CAUSE
This finally brings us to the question of good cause, and just
what constitutes sufficient reason to invade the private files of the
attorney and obtain information which he has secured in prepara-
tion for trial for his client. The major difficulty in this field is that
while most courts speak of good cause, they do not always discuss
whether they are referring to the requirement of Rule 34, or whether
they are considering what good cause is necessary to obtain the
work product of the attorney. For that reason the concept will be
discussed under three headings: those courts which are definitely
discussing work product, those which are definitely discussing Rule
34, and those which do not definitely state to which they are refer-
ring.
A. Good Cause Under Work Product Doctrine. Many courts
have followed the spirit of the Hickman decision and declared that
the work product, though protected, is not immune from dis-
69. B & S Drilling Co. v. Hallibuton Oil Well Cementing Co., 24 F.B.D. 1 (S.D. Tex.
1959); Klop v. United Fruit Company, 18 F.R.D. 310 (S.D. N.Y. 1955); McNelley v.
Perry, 18 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
70. B & S Drilling Co. v. HaUibuton Oil Well Cementing Co., 24 F.R.D. 1 (S.D. Tex.
1959).
71. Walczak v. Detroit-Pittsburgh Motor Freight, 140 F.Supp. 10 (N.D. Ind. 1956).
72. Sunday v. Gas Service Co., 10 F.R.D. 185 (W.D. Mo. 1950).
73. O'Brien v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc..of United States, 13 F.R.D. 475 (W.D. Mo.
1953).
74. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 16 F.R.D. 5 (S.D. N.Y. 1954).
75. B & S Drilling Co. v. Hallibuton Oil Well Cementing Co., 24 F.R.D. 1 (S.D. Tex.
1959).
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covery,7 6 when rare or unusual circumstances are present."7 Some
have stated that a stringent standard of good cause should be shown
equivalent to the stringent policy that protects the attorney's, files. . 8
Some jurisdictions have properly drawn a distinct line between the
good cause necessary under Rule 34 and the unusual circumstances
that would constitute the good cause necessary to obtain the work
product of the attorney.79 Though the courts that definitely estab-
lish the existence of work product may agree on the foregoing prin-
ciples, they seldom agree to just what factual situations warrant
discovery under the stricter good cause principle. The following are
some of the factual situations in which good cause was discussed.
The work of experts, considered by the courts as work product,
was discoverable when the subject of the expert's report was no
longer in existence. 80 Anticipated hostility of the witnesses is not
considered good cause,81 but actual hostility may be.8 2  Inequality
of funds or facilities of the client,8 3 or greater hardship,8 4 has been
rejected as constituting good cause. Unavailability of witnesses is
not good cause.8 The fact that a witness is out of the state is in-
sufficient,80 but being at sea has been considered acceptable.8 7 Loss
of memory .by witnesses has been called good cause for obtaining
his statement.88  Hope of impeachment is not sufficient.8 9  More
liberal courts have allowed discovery when witnesses are unavail-
able90 or simply unknown.9"
B. Good Cause Decided Under Rule 34. By contrast, it is in-
teresting to note the factual situations which do or do not constitute
76. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 16 F.R.D. 5 (S.D. N.Y. 1954).
77. Vilastor-Kent Theatre Corp. v. Brandt, 19 F.R.D. 522 (S.D. N.Y. 1956); Scourtes
v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953); United States v. Deere
& Co., 9 F.R.D. 523 (D. Minn. 1949); State of Maryland v. Baltimore and 0. R. Co., 7
F.R.D. 666 (E.D. Penn. 1947)
78. Vilastor-Kent Theatre Corp. v. Brandt, 19 F.R.D. 522 (S.D. N.Y. 1956); Connecti-
cut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 16 F.R.D. 5 (S.D. N.Y. 1954).
79. See Marks v. Gas Service Company, 168 F.Supp.487 (W.D. Mo. 1958); Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F.Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954); Scourtes v.
Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
80. Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D. N.J. 1954); Colden v. R. J.
Schofield Motors, 14 F.R.D. 521 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
81. Tandy & Allen Construction Co. v. Peerless Casualty Co., 20 F.R.D. 223 (S.D.
N.Y. 1957); Portman v. American Home Products Corp., 9 F.R.D. 613 (S.D. N.Y. 1949).
82. See Tandy & Allen Construction Co. v. Peerless Casualty Co., 20 F.R.D. 223 (S.D.
N.Y. 1957).
83. Lester v. Isbrandtsen Co., 10 F.R.D. 338 (S.D. Tex. 1950); Portman v. American
Home Products Corporation, 9 F.R.D. 613 (S.D. N.Y. 1949 ).
84. Portman v: American Home Products Corporation, 9 F.R.D. 613 (S.D. N.Y. 1949).
85. Lester v. Isbandtsen Co., 10 F.R.D. 338 (S.D. Tex. 1950).
86. Berger v. Central Vermont Ry., 8 F.R.D. 419 (D Mass. 1948).
87. Bifferato v. States Marine Corp. of Delaware, 11 F.R.D. 44 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
88. Thomas v. Trawler Red J'ackct, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 349 (D. Mass. 1954).
89. Carpenter-Trant Drilling Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp. 23 F.R.D. 257 (D. Neb.
1959).
90. Atlantic Greyhound' Coryoration v. Lauritzen, 182 F.2d 540 (6th Cir. 1950).
91. Stone v. Grayson Shops, Inc., 8 F.R.D. 101 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
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good cause under Rule 34. A few examples should illustrate that in
some cases this standard is not greatly different from that applied
by courts deciding under the work product test, while in others the
definition of good cause is much more liberal. It has been held
that if the statements were taken before memories dimmed that
good cause was shown. 2 Also, if parties were grief-stricken' or
hospitalized for a long period after the accident,94 good cause is
provided. Good cause is also indicated under Rule 34 due to wit-
nesses' unavailability- or hostility,96 indication of dishonest answers
at deposition,0 ' lapse of memory,98 lack of technical knowledge
sufficient to ask intelligent questions, 9 or just relevancy and sole
possession by adversary. 10 Yet in other cases, good cause has not
been shown by hostility of witnesses701 nor a witness's being out of
state. 10 2 It has also been held that the taking of a deposition pre-
cludes discovery of a statement.'0 "
C. When Issue Not Decided. A great difficulty arises in that
many courts do not distinguish between good cause under the work
product doctrine and under Rule 34; and where it is not clear from
the language of the court or the facts of the case whether or not
work product is involved, it is impossible to determine what stand-
ard of cause these cases are applying. The matter is further compli-
cated because some courts appear to be interpreting Hickman as a
definition of good cause under Rule 34.104
Some of these courts have felt good cause to exist when material
is in sole possession of the adversary,' when witnesses are dead'
or hostile,10 7 when there is lapse of memory of witnesses,108 or where
92. Marks v. Gas Service Company, 168 F.Supp. 487 (W.D. Mo. 1958); Brown v.
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 17 F.R.D. 324 (S.D. N.Y. 1955).
93. Dulansky v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Co., 10 F.R.D. 146 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
94. Henderson v. Southern Railway Co., 17 F.R.D. 349 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
95. See United States v. Great Northern Railway Co., 18 F.R.D. 357 (N.D. Calif. 1955)
(dictum).
96. Hanke v. Milwaukee Electric By. and Transport Co., 7 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. Wis.
1947).
97. See United States v. Great Northern Railway Co., 18 F.R.D. 357 (N.D. Calif. 1955)
(dictum).
98. Roach v. Bostc-i Two Boat Company, 19 F.R.). 267 (D. Mass. 1956).
99. Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Penn. 1950).
100. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F.Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954);
Hirshorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 8 F.R.D. 11 (W.D. Penn. 1948).
101. Burns v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 113 F.Supp. 48 (E.D. Penn. 1953).
102. Reeves v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 8 F.R.D. 616 (D. Del. 1949).
103. Weaver v. Erie R. Co., 15 F.R.D. 257 (E.D. N.Y. 1954).
104. See Safeway Stores v. Reynolds, 176 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Hudalla v. Chi-
cago, M.S.P. & P.R. Co., 10 F.R.D. 363 (D. Minn. 1950).
105. G. & P. Amusement Co. v. Regent Theatre Co., 9 F.R.D. 721 (N.D. Ohio 1949);
Rockett v. John J. Casele, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 575 (S.D. N.Y. 1947).
106. Hesch v. Erie R. Co., 14 F.R.D. 518 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
107. Brookshire v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 14 F.R.D. 154 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
108. Tannenbaum v. Walker, 16 F.R.D. 570 (E.D. Penn 1954).
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the party did not know who had given statements." 9 However,
good cause was not shown when allegation was on the grounds of
mere convenience,11 witnesses would not speak privately,," or
documents were not readily available.' Also good cause was not
shown when a party had the opportunity to take his own tests"' or
statements." 4
VIII. HICKMAN IN STATE COURTS
Finally, it might be interesting to note how the Hickman decision
has been received in some of the state courts. Arizona and Con-
necticut 1 ' appear to follow the case quite completely, although the
latter does make absolute exemption to the opinions and theories of
the attorney. -l" California does not consider the work of experts a
work product," 7 and by gratis dictum in the same case they state
that the Hickman decision may not be so fully applicable in Cali-
fornia as they still rely more extensively on the pleadings."' Dela-
ware seems to have followed the true spirit by stating that greater
cause for the production of work product will be required." 9  Flo-
rida apparently interprets the Hickman case as making the work
product immune and not simply protected." -2° Minnesota, by amend-
ment to their rules, has made the work product absolutely im-
mune."1 2  Utah has amended their rules to state that the produc-
tion of the work product will not be required except under undue
hardship or injustice, and documents that reveal the attorney's opin-
ions or theories will never be discoverable.
12 2
IX. CONCLUSION
The Hickman case attempted a general statement of classifica-
tion, and as such it necessarily must be applied in greatly varying
ways when specifics are encountered. The courts have had difficulty
in determining just what work product is, and even more difficulty
in deciding what unusual circumstances should warrant its discov-
ery. Other courts have not even attempted to follow the Hickman
109. Bennett v. New York Centr. R. Co., 9 F.R.D. 17 (N.D. N.Y. 1949).
110. Hilton v. Contiship Corporation, 16 F.R.D. 453 (S.D. N.Y. 1954).
111. Watn v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 19 F.R.D. 358 (E.D. Penn. 1956).
112. Dellameo v. Great Lakes S. S. Co., 9 F.R.D. 77 (N.D. Ohio 1949)
113. United States v. 5 Cases, 9 F.R.D. 81 (D. Conn. 1949).
114. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Little Rock Basket Co., 14 F.R.D. 383 (E.D. Ark. 1953).
115. See Prizio v. Penachio, 115 A.2d 340 (Conn. 1955).
116. Dean v. Superior Court, 324 P.2d 764 (Ariz. 1958).
117. Grand Lake Drive In, Inc. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.Rptr. 621 (1960).
118. Ibid. at 627 (dictum).
119. Frank C. Sparks Company v. Huber Baking Company, 114 A.2d 657 (Del. 1955).
120. See Florida Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Allen, 40 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1949).
121. Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.02, 34. For a discussion see Brown v. Saint Paul City By. Co.,
62 N.W.2d 688 (Minn. 1954).
122. Utah R. Civ. P. 30(b). For a discussion of this rule see Mower v. McCarthy, 245
P.2d 224 (Utah 1952).
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decision. It seems that only through experience will the work pro-
duct doctrine become more defined, and its application more uni-
form.
DAVID F. KNUTSON.
SOME NEW CONCEPTS OF
THE JOINT BANK ACCOUNT
Entering a bank, A deposits money in a savings account and in-
structs the teller to list the depost in the passbook and on the bank
records as standing to the account of "A or B." This situation as
well as the equally common situations where deposits are made to
the account of "A and B," "A and/or B," and "A and B or the survi-
vor," as well as other variant forms, presents complex and baffling
questions of law which have lately been engaging the attention of
courts, practitioners, and legal scholars.' The critical inquiry in
most instances is as to the nature of the interests held by A and B
in the funds which have been deposited. Is there a right of survi-
vorship so that if either A or B dies the surviving depositor is en-
titled to all the money? Does B possess a right of present with-
drawal with regard to the funds on deposit? Do the foregoing ar-
rangements violate the Statute of Wills? It is widely agreed that the
answers to these questions depend primarily upon the intention of
the depositor,' but a question may arise as to what evidence is
material to show this intent.- On the other hand, if the dispute
arises over the existence of a right of survivorship, it is possible to
find cases saying that intent to create such a right is insufficient
standing alone, and that compliance with the requirements for cre-
ation of a joint tenancy - i. e., that the joint tenants must share the
unities of time, title, interest, and possession - must also be shown.4
1. See generally Bogert, The Cleation of Trusts by Means of Bank Deposits, 1 Cornell
L. Q. 159 (1916); Jones, The Use of Joint Bank Accounts as a Substitute for Testament-
ary Disposition of Property, 17 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 42 (1955); Kepner, The Joint and Survi-
vorship Bank Account - A Concept Without a Name, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 596 (1953);
Townsend, Creation of Joint Rights Between Husband and Wife in Personal Property, 52
Mich. L. Rev. 779 (1954); 1957 U. Ill. L. F. 655.
2. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 169 Cal. 287, 146 Pac. 647 (1915); In re Murdock's Estate,
238 Iowa 898, 29 N.W.2d 177 (1947); Napier v.. Eigel, 350 Mo. 11, 164 S.W.2d 908
(1942); McGillivray v. First Nat. Bank, 56 N.D. 152, 217 N.W. 150 (1927); Reel v.
Hansboro State Bank, 52 N.D. 182, 201 N.W. 861 (1924); King v. Merryman, 196 Va.
844, 86 S.E.2d 141 (1955).
3. See In re Murdock's Estate, supra, note 2, at 179; Kowal v. Sang, 318 Mich. 312,
28 N.W.2d 113, 117 (1947); Olander v. City of Omaha, 242 Neb. 340, 6 N.W.2d 62,
64 (1942).
4. See Appeal of Garland, 126 Me. 84, 136 Ati. 459, 464 (1927); Wright v. Knapp,
183 Mich. 656, 150 N.W. 315, 316 (1915); In re Gerling's Estate, 303 S.W.2d 915, 917
(Mo. 1957); In re Walker's Estate, 340 Pa. 13, 16 A.2d 28, 29 (1940); In re Lower's
Estate, 48 S.D. 172, 203 N.W. 312, 315 (1925).
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